Failed invasion

South Asia expert Citha Maaß researched Afghanistan for many years at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) in Berlin before retiring in September 2011. Today, she works in Berlin with grade school children of Turkish and Arab heritage.

DW: What has changed in Afghanistan in the past 10 years?

Citha Maaß: Fewer people are starving. The well-noted developments in education and health really exist. But in my opinion, the main point of criticism is that the state structures have been built up incorrectly. The achievements, which we in fact have realized there, cannot be lasting. The international community has contributed to placing a highly corrupt government in office.

That is an abysmal report after 10 years.

I would say the invasion failed.

Where did the West make its biggest mistakes in your opinion?

The development of state institutions, which took place in the first three or four years had structural errors and noticeably got on the wrong track. President Hamid Karzai has received a wide range of power thanks to the new US-supported constitution. It is not balanced by counterchecks. The international community introduced an electoral law that consciously keeps the parliament weak. This means a parliament has been set up that is noticeably corrupt and its majority decisions can be bought. That's why the population has no faith in the political system and the large majority of the Afghan population cannot articulate itself politically. The result is that the local commanders, the previous warlords, can continue to exert their power.

That sounds bitter.

Yes. I am very concerned about this. I fear foremost for the Afghans whose lives we have built up and strengthened over the past 10 years, who want to get involved in their country's development and now fear for their lives. November 2009 plays a big role here, when President Karzai had himself inaugurated for a second term following highly fraudulent elections. This was a serious marker, because with that election, the handover process was set in motion.

This is a handover process in which the international community and the Americans have made themselves political hostages of President Karzai and the regional rulers he has appointed. We as the international community can no longer exert pressure on the Afghan government to take stronger action against corruption or combat drug trafficking. It is this Afghan government with its corrupt structures to whom we want to hand over the security responsibilities and political power.

Which role does religion play in the Afghanistan conflict?

It is a basic element of Afghan society. It should be viewed completely unbiased. Afghan society isn't radical, extremist or Islamist, but it is very conservative. That was practically completely ignored until the end of 2005. But around that time it became clear that you can't only work with the western-orientated Afghan nongovernmental organizations, but also with those which we consider as traditional authorities: with Islamic clerics and also with traditional tribal elders, who still have authority in their respective regions.

This collaboration should have begun much earlier. However, this would require that reconstruction aid is not given according to western criteria and western priorities but rather by asking the village elder or mullah: "What would you like? Do you really need the girls' school or would you prefer a health clinic or a small road so you can take your wares to the market?" We didn't ask the local authorities enough.

After 10 years, negotiations with the Taliban are the order of the day. Negotiations sound great, but with whom and how?

Let me go back to the first Afghanistan conference on the Petersberg near Bonn, Germany in December 2001. Obviously, the Taliban could not have been invited to the negotiating table. But credible representatives from the southern Afghan Pashtu tribes should have been invited. Those sitting first and foremost at that Petersberg conference were the war allies of the United States, including war criminals and drug lords of the Northern Alliance. There were also exile groups represented. But there were no representatives from the southern Afghan Pashtu tribes present and this group encompasses more than a third of the Afghan population. Furthermore, if we want to bring about a lasting peace, you also have to talk to the losers of the war.

What do you think the western alliance is concerned about today?

It's about a face-saving withdrawal and unfortunately nothing more. The big unknown though is what will the United States do in Afghanistan for strategic and economic reasons? That is the big question mark.

The withdrawal of western forces is planned for 2014. What is your outlook for Afghanistan?

All scenarios you can imagine right now have a high component of civil war. There is a high risk that there could be a civil war after 2014. There are, however, also power interests and economic interests which say otherwise - and I'm not thinking of the Taliban in this case, but rather of President Karzai and the regional rulers he appointed. They are interested in maintaining the growing crime and the asymmetrical war against insurgent groups right beneath the threshold of civil war so that they can continue their illegal dirty business. They need the drug business and underground economy which provides them with significant profits, after all.

I think that the international financial and reconstruction aid will continue on a smaller scale. And in order to benefit from it, you can't allow a civil war to happen. I could imagine that the situation right now is a very realistic scenario.

On December 5, an international conference in Bonn will negotiate Afghanistan's future again. What do you expect from it?

I fear that it will be a huge media spectacle, like the London conference in January 2010 and all the earlier Afghanistan conferences. I again refer to the fact that it's too late to apply thumbscrews on President Karzai. International governments are facing important elections. President Barack Obama is fighting for reelection. The German government starts campaigning in 2013 and France's President Nicolas Sarkozy is also facing elections. All these governments that are coming to Bonn have no interest in revealing the noticeable failure. They will build up a nice facade instead.

What is the central lesson from the Afghanistan invasion?

Before you enter a country, you should think about a strategy. If you intervene militarily, you should from the first also include an exit strategy, at least strategically. The second important lesson is to look exactly at the respective domestic partner. Are these partners even in the position to bring peace to their country? Do they have enough power or are they internally so divided that it's already clear from the outset that the seed of discord can be sowed again? Third, agreement should be reached from the start on a reconstruction strategy for internal forces within civil society.

And these forces should be supported according to their own needs. It shouldn't be about selling quick results to the population back home because of elections. Afghanistan is a model case for invasions undertaken for the motives and interests of the intervening states. In the process, the structural and societal causes in the invaded country were not considered.

Interview: Sandra Petersmann / sac
Editor: Rob Mudge