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ConflictsUkraine

With Ukraine a slog and Syria aflame, Russia is worn thin

Grzegorz Szymanowski in Riga
December 5, 2024

Because of its war in Ukraine, Russia can't easily boost its intervention on behalf of dictator Bashar Assad, who is fighting rebels in Syria. But the Kremlin cannot abandon its strategic Middle Eastern ally either.

Banner shows portraits of Putin and Assad in Aleppo, northern Syria, on Oct. 17, 2015
Though Russia once helped Assad turn the tide, there is less the Kremlin can offer nowImage: Kyodo News/imago

Aleppo has long been considered a symbol of Russia's strength.

After government troops spent four years fighting rebels for control of the city, it was the Russian military that helped Syrian President Bashar Assad lock down control at the end of 2016.

Now, as part of the current offensive by the pro-Turkish Islamist militia Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), Aleppo has fallen to the rebels in less than four days.

"Russia is no longer in the position to support the Assad regime as it did ten years ago," Ruslan Suleimanov, a Russian researcher at the ADA University in Azerbaijan's capital Baku, told DW.

Although Russia is once more carrying out airstrikes in a bid to support Syria's governmental forces under President Assad, it is not enough to stop the HTS, according to Suleimanov.

The main difference to the previous battle of Aleppo is that Russia has been much more preoccupied with its war in Ukraine since February 2022.

"Obviously, the Russian presence in Syria began to shrink afterwards," Suleimanov told DW.

Russian President Vladimir Putin, center, poses with Russian fighter pilots
Russia uses Syria's Hmeimim air base as platform to be operational in the entire regionImage: ZUMA Press/imago

Russia's strength lies in airstrikes

However, the Russian troop contingent in Syria has always been relatively small.

In 2015, when Russian President Vladimir Putin decided to militarily strengthen Bashar Assad four years into the civil war, he mainly deployed his air force in Syria.

According to estimates, as official figures have never been released, only between 2,000 and 4,000 soldiers were additionally deployed.

This number is likely to have remained the same.

In addition, almost the same number of mercenaries, such as those of the Wagner Group, were added at the time.

The latter were involved in ground battles in Syria more often than regular soldiers.

However, nowadays these fighters are based in Ukraine.

"The Russian strategy was about Syrian, Iranian, and Shia militias doing the fighting and Russian forces providing support, not the other way around," US analysts Michael Kofman and Matthew Rojansky wrotein a study for the US Army University Press in 2018. 

Meanwhile, Iran and its allied militias such as Hezbollah have been weakened by the conflict with Israel. The Islamist Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) rebels have seized the opportunity to advance.

Forces likely withdrawn from Syria

It remains to be seen if Russia can fill this gap in ground forces.

"It will be very difficult to increase aid to Assad without weakening its own troops in Ukraine," Pavel Luzin, an expert on the Russian armed forces, told DW.

Following the invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Russia had denied plans to withdraw troops from Syria. However, it reportedly moved a number of fighter jets back to their home ports. And the S-300 anti-aircraft missile system was shipped to a Russian port near Crimea.

Soldiers in Syria were regrouped and moved from smaller posts to larger bases. Furthermore, the transfer of combat-experienced mercenaries to Ukraine has weakened Russia's position.

Although other Kremlin mercenaries are currently in Syria, "they are not specialized in combat missions, but in monitoring oil production facilities, for example," according to Ruslan Suleimanov.

Moscow unwilling to give up Syria

While the war in Ukraine remains a top priority for Russia, "Putin will certainly not abandon Assad," Suleimanov said.

After all, Moscow has two important locations at stake: the naval base in Tartus secures access to the Mediterranean, and the Hmeimim air base makes it possible to be operational in the entire region.

Syria also plays an important role for the Kremlin in maintaining its image as a superpower. After the failed Western interventions in Iraq and Libya, Russia wanted to present itself as a stabilizing factor in the region and was able to successfully establish itself as a player in the Middle East.

Moskva missile cruiser near the Tartus port of Syria before it sank.
Syria's Tartus port is a key hub for Russian missile cruisersImage: Zhang Jiye/Xinhua/IMAGO

Negotiations instead of new troops

Russia's initial reactions to the rebel offensive indicate that it would prefer not to deploy additional military resources to Syria.

However, air strikes are still being stepped up. 

According to the Russian telegram channel 'Rybar', General Alexander Chaiko, who has previously led Russian troops in Syria, arrived in the country.

In parallel, Moscow is also seeking contact with other powers involved, above all Turkey, which is benefiting the most from the rebels' advance.

Putin has spoken to Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan on the phone, and representatives of Russia, Iran and Turkey are due to meet next weekend.

"These are very difficult and exhausting negotiations for the Kremlin, which is already devoting so much nerve, energy and resources to Ukraine," states orientalist Ruslan Suleimanov.

In his view, it is a given that the Kremlin will have to divert some of these resources to Syria.

Will Russia tip the scales for Syria's Assad again?

This article was originally published in German.